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CHAPTER 1 - WHAT IS INDIA UP TO? 
An Emerging Concern 
During the 1970s and early 1980s, one of the most 
debated strategic concerns in Australia was the growing Soviet 
influence - and perceived maritime build-up - in the Indian Ocean 
and Southwest Pacific region. Today, those fears have abated 
as the threat of increased Soviet influence and presence has 
largely failed to materialise and, anyway. has been muted by the 
emerging detente between East and West. But. particularly in 
the 1980s, a new concern has emerged - the sustained but steady 
growth of the Indian navy, and its implications for the region. 
It is indicative to note that in 1978, the total number 
of articles o n the maritime build-up of the Soviet Union and Indi a 
featured in the Asian Defence Journal, International Defense 
Review~ United States Naval Institute Proceedings. and Pacific 
Defence Reporter totalled six and two respectively. In 1988 , the 
the figures were eight and nine respectively. 
These trends have also been reflected in seminars and 
studies conducted by Australian academic institutions. ANU's 
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre. for example. has published 
three working papers on the Soviet maritime build-up, compared t o 
five on India, since 1975. In Western Australia, the Curtin 
University of Technology established the Centre for Indian Ocean 
Regional Studies (CIORS) 1n 1986 and conducted a seminar titled 
I ~, 'Australia and the Indian Ocean' in March 1988. CIORS also 
planned to conduct another titled 'Indian Ocean Navies' 1n 
2 
September 1989. 
At the official level, the concerns of the Australian 
government have been reflected in reports produced by 
Parliamentary Committees on Defence and Foreign Affairs. In 1976, 
a committee examined the growing influence within the region of 
the Soviet Union; in 1989, a Senate committee examined relations 
between Australia and India. It is also significant to note that 
when Prime Minister Hawke visited India in February 1989, one of 
the key issues on his agenda was to seek an explanation for 
India1s naval expansion. 1 
Indian Explanations 
As Hawke found out, and as numerous other politicians 
and diplomats have found out before him, India1s explanations 
vary considerably, usually depending on who is asking the 
question. Hawke, for example, was assured by then Prime Minister 
Gandhi that the explanation lay in the need to protect India1s 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ) from outside exploitation. 2 Hawke 
was reportedly given confidential examples of recent infringements 
of India1s EEZ, and came away from his meeting saying that he was 
now not concerned about the Indian naval build-up. 3 
Yet during a recent visit to Australia, the respected 
Indian academic Dr Ram Subramanian assured audiences that the real 
reason related to the threat posed by China. 4 On ot.her 
1 
2 
3 
4 
See editorial in The Australian, 10/2/89, p. 10. 
See Rajiv Ganghi quoted in Sydney Morning Herald, 
11/2/89, p. 19. 
Quoted in Western Australian, 11-12/2/89, p. 8. 
View expressed during discussions with defence officials 
in Canberra in May 1989. 
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occaslons, Indian officials have inferred that India's maritime 
growth relates only to the threat posed by its South Asian 
neighbours, or to deter the Americans from interfering in sub-
regional affairs. 
Each of these explanations has some degree of 
credibility. No single explanation, though, seems able to 
provide sufficient justification for India's program of maritime 
expanslon. More likely is that the explanation lies ln a 
combination of economic, diplomatic, security, national and 
strategic factors, as well as India's overall geo-political 
circumstances. The difficulty is that because Indian politicians 
and officials frequently still use a single, threat-related 
explanation, India appears uncertain of its own strategic 
direction. The region undoubtedly will watch with interest 
whether the newly-elected government of V.P. Singh is able, or 
willing, to better explain India's motives. 
Interpreting India's Motives 
Certainly one of the central problems ln assesslng 
India's maritime expansion is that most Western observers lack 
any real understanding of Indian strategic thinking - exacerbated 
by the fact that India itself does not appear to have any clearly 
articulated or agreed strategic purpose to its program of naval 
expansion. 5 
Many of the threats identified by Indian officials and 
commentators lack specificity or are clearly exaggerated, at least 
5 See M. Joshi, -Indian Defence and Australia ' ln 
The Hindu, 17/6/89. 
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ln Western eyes. Vague threat perceptions obviously make it 
difficult, in any defence force, to define the force structure 
needed to combat them. Perhaps more worrying is that open-ended, 
worst-case scenarios, even if only intended to justify capability 
requirements to a domestic audience, often unsettle neighbouring 
states and can result in an escalation of the very threat they are 
supposed to mitigate. 
Certainly the nature and scope of India's actual 
acquisition program seems to suggest that it is not directed 
towards any specific operational objective. Indeed, most 
commentators are careful not to suggest that the Indian naval 
build-up constitutes a threat. 6 Others argue that Western 
observers are drawing alarmist conclusions from what should be 
seen simply as "a process of normal ... modernisation". 7 The 
accusation is also made that Western observers have grown used to 
Ita global naval map dominated by a Western monopoly" . and thus see 
something sinister in a third world country expanding into 'the 
natura 1 order'. 8 
The Reality 
6 
7 
8 
A number of states within the Indian Ocean littoral, 
See D. Warner, 'JaneJs startling look at Moscow and 
New Delhi' in Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, July 1990, 
p. 37. 
See, for example, K. Booth and W.L. Dowdy, 'Structure 
and Strategy in Indian Ocean Naval Developments' in 
W.L. Dowdy and R.B. Trood (eds.), The Indian Ocean: 
Perspectives on a Strategic Arena, Duke University 
Press, Durham, 1985, p. 97. 
Booth and Dowdy, The Indian Ocean, p. 97. Indeed, 
Australian commentators are criticised for worrying 
about the growth of Indian capabilities, while "see[ing] 
nothing wrong with their own forward posture": M. Joshi, 
'Indian Defence and Australia', The Hindu, 17/6/89. 
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however, are concerned by India's maritime growth. 9 After his 
recent visit to Indonesia, the Australian Vice-Chief of the 
Defence Force commented that "Indonesia is particularly concerned II 
and noted that, according to the Indonesians, lithe Indians have 
not been able to explain it to the rest of us". 10 South-east 
Asian mainland countries have been less public in their comments. 
Nevertheless, Singapore's Goh Chok Tong, then First Deputy Prime 
Minister, told a political meeting in February 1990 that India was 
the obvious candidate to fill any power vacuum should the United 
States reduce its presence and influence in South-east Asia. 11 
His comments were reiterated shortly afterwards by Brigadier 
Genera 1 Lee. 12 
The basis of the concerns of some regional countries 
becomes apparent when regional naval strengths are tabulated, as 
shown at Table 1.1 (overleaf). 
9 
10 
11 
12 
See, for example, M.C. Dunn and J.A. Ackerman , 
Beyond the Great Game: The India-Pakistan Balance and 
US Interests, Special Report No.1, 1989 Series, 
The International Estimate, 1989, pp. 6 and 8. 
Vice Admiral Beaumont, quoted in Far Eastern Economic 
Review, 8 March 1990. 
Goh Chok Tong, quoted in The Economist, 3 March 1990, 
p. 26. 
Brigadier General Lee, quoted in The Sunday Times 
(Singapore), 11 March 1990, p. 1. 
I 
Iii 
6 
Table 1.1. Comparison of Indian Ocean regional naval strengths 
A B C D E F G H I J K 
Manpower (K) 52 300 16 14 8 7.5 7.5 12 43 16 124 
Submarines 17 
Carriers 2 
Destroyers 5 
Frigates 24 
Corvettes 5 
Missile 27 
craft 
Mine war- 20 
fare craft 
Amphibious 10 
vessels 
Anti- 49 
submarine 
aircraft 
Maritime 8 
reconnaissance 
aircraft 
Index: 
115 
0 
19 
34 
10 
235 
128 
76 
12 
12 
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
I 
J 
K 
6 
0 
8 
10 
0 
8 
3 
0 
9 
3 
0 
0 
3 
5 
0 
10 
3 
7 
10 
5 
India 
China 
Pakistan 
Iran 
0 
0 
0 
8 
0 
13 
4 
12 
20 
0 
Saudi Arabia 
South Africa 
Bangladesh 
Malaysia 
Indonesia 
Australia 
3 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 0 0 
0 3 4 
0 0 0 
9 4 8 
9 0 5 
0 0 2 
14 0 6 
0 0 0 
Total (less India and China) 
2 6 
0 0 
0 3 
15 9 
0 0 
4 0 
2 5 
15 1 
9 5 
15 20 
Sources: Military Balance 1988/89, International Institute of 
Strategic Studies, London, 1988, pp. 161-2; Pacific 
Defence Reporter, Annual Reference Edition 1988/89, 
XV, 6/7, December 1988/January 1989, pp. 151-2, 157 , 
169, 172-4, 176-7, 179, 182-4; and Jane's Defence 
Weekly, 17 June 1988, p. 1223. 
17 
0 
14 
54 
0 
56 
31 
37 
73 
43 
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One obvious conclusion from this table is that, within 
the Indian Ocean littoral, India's maritime forces are quantit-
atively superior to any other state. Indeed, disregarding China, 
they are at least half of the remainder in total (compare column A 
with K). Still, some would argue that it is misleading to set 
ships off against each other numerically, or to seek explanations 
in tables. Admiral Kohli, for example, argues that it is more 
relevant to examine the threat posed by the military capability of 
a potential opponent and then assess -counter-assets'. 13 
Kohli's suggested methodology is obviously useful, and 
will be taken into account as this paper examines the range of 
I possible explanations for India's maritime expansion. 
Hypothesis 
An emerging view is that India's maritime expanslon 
relates not to a particular threat, nor to the protection of 
particular interests. Rather, it seems to relate to the perception 
that India is not a status quo power. and that New Delhi sees the 
development of a blue-water navy as a means of enhancing its 
prestige and facilitating its recognition as a regional power and 
global actor. 14 
13 
14 
S.N. Kohli, Sea Power and the Indian Ocean. McGraw-
Hill, New, Delhi. 1978, p. 111. 
This view was expounded by M. McKinley in his paper 
-From Dante to Shannon', presented at the -Australia and 
the Indian Ocean Seminar'. organised by the Centre for 
Indian Ocean Regional Studies (CIORS). Curtin University 
of Technology. Perth in March 1988. Note that a blue-
water navy in this paper refers to the capability 
to project a viable naval task force. operating well 
beyond mainland support. 
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The 'great-power I view has sufficient credibility to be 
taken seriously, particularly given that no single cause seems 
able to explain India's force structure. The perplexing issue 
is why Gandhi, and figures such as Subramanian and Professor K. 
Subrahmanyam, frequently still use a single, threat-related '-..r-JI""' 
explanatio~ in seeking to rationalise India's current and planned 
strategic capabilities. 
In part. it is probably because India is reluctant to 
antogonise its neighbours by specifically identifying them as real 
or potential threats. 15 Another possible reason, though. IS 
that India seems not to have developed clearly-articulated 
strategic objectives; it has no equivalent of Australia's white 
papers on defence; and there is practically no attempt made to 
debate the issues in parliament or public forums. It may be for 
these reasons that some Indians have difficulty in explaining 
convincingly the purpose of their country's maritime expansion. 
India would perhaps be well advised to review its 
threat perceptions, and then develop strategic objectives and 
policy which realistically enhanced its national security. The 
demise of Gandhi IS Congress (I) party at the recent elections 
would seem to provide the new government of V.P. Singh with a 
timely opportunity for such re-assessment. Provided it were done 
in such a way as to involve parliamentary debate and public 
discussion, India should be able to develop a defence force 
structure which is sustainable and which could be rationalised, 
both domestically and to the region. 
15 The counter-point is that India would probably never 
acknowledge that Pakistan or Bangladesh, in particular, 
could ever pose a serious threat to India's sovereignty. 
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Approach 
Most discussions on the subject of India's maritime 
expanslon spend some time tracing the development of the navy from 
the time of independence. There appears little to be gained 
by the exercise, apart from highlighting the fact that much of 
India's naval growth has occurred since about the mid 1970s, as 
illustrated at Table 1.2. 
Table 1.2 . Quantitative growth of the Indian navy since the 
mid 19708 
1978 1983 1988 
Manpower (K) 46 47 52 
Submarines 8 8 17 
Carriers 1 1 2 
Destroyers 2 5 
Frigates 25 21 24 
Corvettes 3 3 5 
Missile 16 16 27 
craft 
Amphibious 7 10 10 
vessels 
Anti- 20 31 49 
submarine 
aircraft 
Maritime 8 8 8 
reconnaissance 
aircraft 
Sources: Military Balance 1978/79, International Institute 
of Strategic Studies, London, 1978, p. 61; 
Military Balance 1983/84, pp. 90-1; and Military 
Balance 1988/89, pp. 161-2. 
J., 
A more useful approach - expanded in Chapter 2 
'Building a Predominant Navy I - seems to be to identify current 
assets and capabilities, and then highlight likely expansion 
between now and the end of the century. The chapter concludes 
10 
r that the Indian navy already possesses the full range of 
I 
traditional naval capabilities and, with a projected fleet 
strength of some 185 ships and submarines by the late 1990s, India 
will continue to be superior to any other regional power or any 
foreseeable combination of regional naVIes. 
Chapter 3 -Is India's Sovereignty Under Threat? I 
examInes whether there is any link between India's maritime growth 
and its professed concerns about the threats posed by Pakistan, 
China, the superpowers, or the -extended' strategic environment. 
It concludes that while Pakistan and China are certainly 
traditional adversaries of India, the nexus between India's naval 
build-up and the threat - or even the potential threat - they pose 
to India is not as clearly defined as some in New Delhi would make 
out. 
Moreover, the threat of Chinese maritime expansion into 
the Indian Ocean seems exaggerated. At best, China may acqUIre a 
blue-water navy by about 2010. Even then, it cannot be assumed 
that India and the Indian Ocean would necessarily be the focus of 
China's attention. Nor does there seem to be any significant 
threat to India's sovereignty posed by the superpowers, a muslim 
conspiracy, or any other combination of states within the regional 
environment. India's claim of being surrounded on all sides 
by potential aggressors seems to relate more to the justification 
of a capability, rather than a realistic threat perception. 
11 
Chapter 4 -Are Indian Interests Under Threat?' examines 
possible threats to India's offshore interests. The interests 
include marine and seabed resources in India's EEZ and the 
remainder of the Indian Ocean, India's interest in Antarctica, 
India's sea lines of communication (SLOCs), India's -overseas' 
population in other Indian Ocean littoral states, and India's 
interest in ensuring the political stability of the small island 
states in the Southwest Indian Ocean region. 
It concludes that none of these interests, per se, 
seems to justify the current or projected force structure of the 
Indian navy. A number of the interests can be protected with 
I less capable assets - such as EEZ resources by the Indian Coast 
Guard. Others - such as seabed mining leases and Indian interests 
in Antarctica - would probably need only a fraction of India's 
naval assets for their reasonable protection. 
In other cases - such as the protection of SLOCs - it 
IS difficult to identify any potential aggressor who could pose 
a serious threat to India's seaborne commerce. It is also argued 
that to project influence over the Indian diaspora, India needs 
only a suitable combination of its existing surface and amphibious 
forces, rather than carrier-based naval task forces, or the 
capability for opposed amphibious operations. 
Chapter 5 -What About Institutionalised Momentum?' 
examines the proposition, occasionally put by Rajiv Gandhi when he 
was Prime Minister, that naval expansion is the result of inertia 
- a combination of historical, political, bureaucratic, 
technological and budgetary factors - quite beyond the control 
12 
of any political leader. Although there is some truth in the 
proposition, the inertia factor should not be exaggerated. 
Gandhi, for example, may once have been able to use the political 
inertia factor as a legitimate excuse, but he was in power long 
enough to have altered at least the direction of policy, if he had 
wished. 
Defence spending also seems to be at odds with India's 
capacity to pay. Maritime expansion, therefore. cannot easily 
be explained away as the process of modernisation, within naval 
budgetary processes. Nor can India's navy build-up be seen 
simply as the consequence of indigenous production capabilities. 
It also seems spurious to suggest - as it sometimes has been -
that navy ships are being built only to provide employment in 
shipyards, or to ensure the continuity of technological expertise. 
These factors certainly contribute towards India's maritime 
expansion, but their importance should not be over-stated. 
Chapter 6 -Is It Simply That India Wants More Status?' 
examlnes the proposition that India aspires now to similar great 
power status, and to be given its -rightful' place in world 
affairs. It concludes that the historical analogy is based on 
historical inaccuracies and, anyway, is hardly a credible 
rationale to offer as justification for India's maritime 
expansion. It also examines India's proponency of the Indian 
Zone of Peace, and Indian moves towards the acquisition of nuclear 
weapons and ballistic missiles. The issue seems to be not 
whether India is deserving of more status, but that it has yet to 
rationalise its aspirations. 
I: 
)1' 
Chapter 7 -Outlook' examines the perception that India 
seems to be trying to promote its image through military power, 
and then discusses the implications for regional stability. It 
notes that India's reliance on military power under Rajiv Gandhi 
has alienated its neighbours and encouraged the very arms race 
that India presumably wants to avoid. The prospects for change 
under the National Front government of V.P. Singh are also 
addressed. 
13 
The paper concludes on the theme that New Delhi has 
failed to explain - either to the region or to its own people -
exactly what India is trying to achieve by its maritime expansion. 
Until India decides where it is going, and develops a coherent 
strategy - involving national consensus - the rest of the world 
will rightly remain wary of India's maritime expansion. 
14 
CHAPTER 2 - BUILDING A PREDOMINANT NAVY 
India's Maritime Forces 
India now has the sixth largest navy in the world, with 
some 52,000 personnel and 135 ships. Its fleet comprises two 
aircraft carriers, five destroyers, 24 frigates, 17 submarines 
(including one nuclear-powered Soviet CHARLIE-class), 50 minor 
surface c ombatants and specialist vessels (such as mine-warfare), 
19 amphibious ships and craft, and 18 support vessels. 1 Naval 
air assets include one squadron of SEA HARRIERS, six helicopter 
squadrons and two squadrons of maritime reconnaissance aircraft. 2 
Aside from the carriers, India's main surface combatants 
are mostly multi-role capable ships, with a mix of British and 
Soviet-style weaponry, rather than the special ised platf '.: 'l-ms 
common to Western naVIes. Nevertheless, India still possesses 
the full range o f traditional naval capabilities, including anti-
surface warfare, anti-submarine warfare, anti-air warfare, mine 
warfare, amphibious warfare, surveillance and naval air support. 
Anti-surface Warfare (A8UW) 
The ASUW capability in the Indian navy is provided 
primarily by the SEA EAGLE air-to-surface missiles (ASM) of the 
1 
2 
Military Balance 1988/89, International Institute of 
Strategic Studies, London, 1988, pp. 161-2. Note that 
these figures do not include the Indian Coastguard, 
which has only limited in-shore capabilities and is 
excluded from further discussion. 
Military Balance 1988/89, pp. 161-2. 
15 
c,:trrier-borne SEA HARRIERS; by variants of the SS-N-2 (STYX) 
missile system fitted to a range of ships; by surface-launched 
torpedoes and various medium-calibre gun systems fitted to a range 
of ships; and by submarine-launched torpedoes (see Table 2.1). 
Table 2.1. Distribution and combat range of ASUW weapon systems 
Weapon System 
SEA EAGLE ASM 
SS-N-2 (STYX) SSM 
surface-launched 
anti-ship torpedoes 
submarine-launched 
anti-ship torpedoes 
113 mm guns 
76 mm guns 
Fitted To 
carrier-borne SEA HARRIER 
aircraft, and SEA KING 
helicopters operating from 
carriers, RAJPUT-class 
destroyers and GODAVARI 
and NILGIRI-class frigates 
RAJPUT-class destroyers; 
GODAVARI, TALWAR and KHUKRI-
class frigates; VILJAY DURG 
and VEER-class corvettes; 
and VIDYUT-class fast attack 
craft 
RAJPUT-class destroyers Qnd 
GODAVARI, NILGIRI and 
KAMORTA-class frigates 
SINDHUGKOSH, SHISHUMAR and 
KURSURA-class submarines 
NILGIRI-class frigates 
RAJPUT-class destroyers 
and KAMORTA-class frigates 
Combat Range 
(weapon system) 
110 km 
80 km SS-N-2C 
40 km SS-N-2A/ 
2B 
< 20 km 
< 20 km 
~ 'J '~m G~ J\. 
15 J<m 
Sources: Pacific Defence Reporter, Annual Reference Edition 
1988/89, XV. 6/7, December 1988/January 1989, p. 178 
and Jane IS Weapon Systems 1988/89, Jane's Publishing 
Company, London. 1988. pp. 446, 500, 503 and 720. 
A schematic illustration of India1s ASUW capability 
coverage, provided by a nominal two-carrier task force - each 
comprising one carrier, two destroyers, six frigates and two 
submarines - is shown at Figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.1. Schematic illustration of India's ASUW capability 
coverage 
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Sources: Jane IS All the World IS Aircraft 1984/85, Jane1s 
Publishing, London, 1984, pp. 225, 230 and 258; and 
Jane's Weapon Systems 1984/85, Jane1s Publishing , 
London, 1984, pp. 75 and 175. 
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Anti-submarine Warfare (ASW) 
The Indian navy has a wide range of ASW-capable units. 
These include its submarine fleet; SEA KING and Ka-25/Ka-28 
helicopters operating from the carriers, the destroyers and 
GODAVARI and NILGIRI-class frigates; and land-based ALIZE 1050, 
11-38 (MAY) and Tu-142M (BEAR F) ASW aircraft. 3 The quantity 
and distribution of these assets is shown at Table 2.2. 
Table 2.2. Indian navy ASW assets 
Asset 
KURSURA-class 
submarines 
SHISHUMAR-class 
submarines 
SINDHUGKOSH-class 
submarines 
Quantity 
8 
2 
6 
SEA KING helicopters 16 
Ka-25/Ka-28 5 
helicopters 
Ka-28 helicopters 
ALIZE 1050 aircraft 
11-38 (MAY) 
aircraft 
Tu-142M (BEAR F) 
aircraft 
18 
10 
3 
8 
Allocated To Combat Radius 
not known 
not known 
not known 
2 x carriers each 600 km 
qty 4 (tota 1 8); 
3 x GODAVARI-class 
frigates qty 2 (6); 
2 x NILGIRI-class 
frigates qty 1 (2) 
5 x RAJPUT 200 km 
destroyers qty 1 
(total 5) 
land-based at Goa 
land-based at Goa 
and Cochin 
land-based at Goa 
land-based at Goa 
200 km 
200 km 
3600 km 
8300 km 
Sources: Military Balance 1988/ 89 . International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, London, 1988, pp. 161-2 and Jane's 
All the World's Aircraft 1984/85, Jane's Publishing, 
London, 1984, pp. 224, 225, 230 and 258. 
17 
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In combination, these units provide the Indian navy with 
a reasonable (by Western standards) ASW capability to detect, 
locate and neutralise conventional submarines operating within the 
~eglon . A schematic illustration o f India's ASW capability 
coverage. provided by a two-carrier task force and supported by 
land-based ASW aircra f t. is shown at Figure 2.2. 
Figure 2.2. 
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Anti-air Warfare (AAW) 
The AAW capability of the navy is provided primarily by 
carrier-borne SEA HARRIER aircraft, equipped with MATRA MAGIC 
air-to-air missiles (AAM) and cannon, and the SA-N-1 (GOA) 
surface-to-air missile (SAM) system fitted to RAJPUT-class 
destroyers. Point air defence systems are fitted to most ships 
In the fleet - the distribution and range of these weapon systems 
IS shown at Table 2.3. 
Table 2.3. Distribution and range of AAW weapon systems 
Weapon System 
MATRA MAGIC AAM 
SA-N-1 (GAO) SAM 
SEA CAT AAM 
SA-N-4 SAM 
~3 A-N-5 SAM 
30mm AD gun system 
40mm BOFORS 
AD gun system 
57mm AD gun system 
Fitted To 
carrier-borne SEA 
HARRIER aircraft 
RAJPUT-class 
destroyers 
NILGIRI-class 
frigat.es 
GODAVARI and 
KHUKRI-class frigates 
PONDICHERRY-class 
mInesweepers 
RAJPUT-class 
destroyers and 
GODAVARI and TALWAR-
class frigates 
VIKRANT carrier 
GODIVARI-class frigates 
and VIJAY DURG-class 
corvettes 
Combat. Range 
(weapon C·"r.-:t 1""1 )' \ ' -.J '- ' '- '_d! 
5 km 
31.5 km 
5.5 km 
14.8 km 
10 }<m 
3-4 km 
3 km 
5-12 km 
Sources: .Jane's Weapons Systems 1988/89, Jane's Publishing, 
London, 1988, pp. 472-3, 476, 501-3 and 504, and 
Jane's Defence Weekly, 10/2/88, p. 1444. 
These systems provide the Indian navy with a reasonable 
expectation of success against conventional air attack and attack 
by STYX-type ASM or SSM systems. 
Mine Warfare 
India has 12 PONDICHERRY-class ocean minesweepers and 
SlX MAHE-class inshore minesweepers. 3 These vessels provide 
an adequate minesweeping capability against moored contact mines# 
but have minimal capability to detect or counter magnetic or 
acoustic mines. 4 The navy can deploy mines from a variety of 
platforms# including RAJPUT-class destroyers # KAMORTA-class 
frigates# KURSURA-class submarines and 11-38 (MAY) aircraft. 
Amphibious Warfare 
India's amphibious capability is provided by one 5500-
tonne logistic landing ship (LSL) # nine GHORPAD-class landing 
ships medium (LSM) and nine landing craft utility (LCU). 5 This 
force provides an amphibious lift capability of about 3000 troops 
and 75 armoured vehicles. 6 
Maritime Surveillance 
India's maritime surveillance capability is provided 
primarily by the land-based 11-38 (MAY) and Tu-142M (BEAR F) 
reconnaissance aircraft. Their respective combat radii are 3600 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Military Balance 1988/89# pp. 161-2 and International 
Defense Review, 4/89# p. 521. 
Jane's Fighting Ships 1985/86# Jane's Publishing 
Company, London, 1986, pp. 238-9 and 567 . 
Military Balance 1988/89, pp. 161-2. 
Jane's Fighting Ships 1985/86, pp. 238 and 572. 
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and 8300 kilometres, enabling coverage over most of the Indian 
Ocean and, especially, the choke points into the region (see 
Figure 2.2). Ship-borne maritime surveillance can also be provided 
- as a secondary role - by the carrier-borne SEA HARRIERS, and SEA 
KING helicopters (see Table 2.2). 
Offensive Naval Air Support 
The Indian Navy Air Arm (INAA) is an integral part of 
the navy, providing maritime strike, ASW and maritime surveillance 
capabilities. Its order of battle is shown at Table 2.4. 
(overleaf) . 
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Table 2.4. Indian Navy Air Arm order of battle * 
Aircraft 
Ship-borne 
SEA HARRIER aircraft 
SEA KING helicopters 
" 
KAMOV Ka-25/28 
helicopters 
CHATAK (Alouette III) 
helicopters 
Land-based 
Tu-142M (BEAR F) aircraft 
11-38 (MAY) aircraft 
DORNIER 228 aircraft 
P1LATUS Maritime Defender 
aircraft 
ALIZE 1050 aircraft 
KAMOV Ka-25/28 
helicopters 
CHATAK (Alouette III) 
helicopters 
Quantity 
11 
16 
6 
5 
3 
5 
3 
26 
18 
10 
18 
8 
Role 
strike/air defence/ 
reconnaissance 
ASW 
AEW/commando assault 
ASW 
ASW/utility 
long range maritime 
surveillance/ASW 
II 
coastal surveillance/ 
EEZ protection 
coastal and short-
range reconnalssance 
ASW/search and rescue 
/reconnaissance 
ASW 
ASW/utility 
* Note that the Indian Air Force (IAF) also subordinates one 
squadron of JAGUAR fighter bombers and two squadrons of 
MIG-21 (FISHBED) aircraft to the INAA. 
Sources: Military Balance 1988/89, pp. 161-2, and 
Jane IS Defence Weekly, 30/7/88, p. 152. 
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Shortcomings 
The Indian navy has a number of serious shortcomings. 7 
Much of its equipment is obsolete. Its logistic system is 
generally poor, outdated and unable to sustain deployments at sea 
over any distance or duration. The diversity of ships, 
weapons and sensors complicates operating procedures, training, 
maintenance and logistic support - and necessitates continuing 
dependence on foreign suppliers. 
The lack of an adequate airborne early warning (AEW) 
capability and gaps in India's AAW defences also mean that the 
fleet is vulnerable to modern missiles, such as EXOCET and 
HARPOON. 8 India's amphibious capabilities - especially in 
situations requiring an opposed landing, or over any distance 
are 1 imi ted. In general, training standards are low, owing to a 
combination of outdated tactics and doctrine, inadequate sea time, 
and a failure to exercise regularly with other major navies. 
The significance of these shortcomings, however, sho~ld 
not be exaggerated. Many of them are not significantly worse 
than those experienced by other navies, including a number In more 
industrialised countries. Certain of these short-comings would 
limit the effectiveness of the Indian navy against another major 
power, but they are less important in the context of regional 
conflict. In support of operations in the Maldives and Sri Lanka, 
for example, the Indian navy performed creditably . 
7 
8 
Judgments about shortcomings in the Indian navy are 
derived from discussions over many years with serving 
and retired naval officers from a number of countries. 
India has reportedly signed a joint venture project with 
British Aerospace for initial R&D on an AEW system: 
Jane IS Defence Weekly, 26/11/88, p. 1372. 
J A IJ!!" 
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Future Acquisitions 
The Indian navy has an active modernisation program to 
replace or upgrade obsolete equipment. Two additional Soviet 
KILO-class submarines. for example. have been delivered in 1989, 
bringing the total of SINDHUGKOSH-classholdings to six. Two 
additional SHISHUMAR-class submarines (FRG Type 1500) are also 
under construction at the Mazagon Dockyard (and expected to be 
completed in the early 1990s). India is reported to have decided 
against further SHISHUMAR-class submarines, but may well consider 
in lieu the indigenous production or acquisition of additional 
SINDHUGKOSH-class vessels in the early 1990s. 9 
India is also in the process of replacing its eight 
KAMORTA-class (Soviet PETYA-class) frigates with indigenously-
constructed KHUKRI-class light frigates. Two KHUKRI-class ships 
were launched at Mazagon in 1987/88, and an additional two at 
Calcutta in late 1988. 10 The navy also intends to replace its 
VIDYUT-class (Soviet OSA-class) missile craft with VEER-class 
(Soviet TARANTUL-class) corvettes. India has already acquired two 
VEER-class vessels from the Soviet Union, reportedly has another 
two or three on order, and has commenced indigenous construction 
at Goa of the first of a reported eight or ten additional 
corvettes. 11 
9 
10 
11 
Some reports suggest that two additional Soviet KILO-
class submarines are to be delivered to India in August 
1989: Pacific Defence Reporter, May 1989, p. 45. 
See International Defense Review, 12/88, p. 1673 and 
Jane IS Defence Weekly, 10/9/88, p. 533. 
Jane IS Fighting Ships 1988/89, Jane1s Publishing, 
London. 1988, p. 140. 
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Press reports also claim that India has signed an 
initial agreement with France for assistance in the indigenous 
construction of an aircraft carrier, to be completed by the late 
1990s. 12 The design would probably be based on the French 
CHARLES DE GAULLE-class - about 35,000 tonnes - be possibly 
nuclear-powered, and probably built at the Cochin shipyards. 
Even though India has expressed an interest in a three-carrier 
navy, it seems more likely that this carrier would only be a 
replacement for the ageing INS VIKRANT. 
There has also been speculation in the press and defence 
journals that India intends to indigenously produce a new class of 
destroyers, reportedly of about 5000 tonnes, under the codename 
.... Project 15'. 13 Construction was to have commenced in late 1987 
at Mazagon but, to date, there have been no reports of progress. 
Outlook 
Based on the acquisition program made public, and a 
reasonable interpretation of lead-times, India's navy seems likely 
by the late 1990s to comprise at least 185 ships, with many of 
them state-of-the-art combatants. A projected ship strength, by 
class, is shown at Table 2.5 (overleaf). 
12 
13 
See, for example, Jane IS Defence Weekly, 11/2/89, p. 
205 and 10/6/89, p. 1124. Some reports speculate that 
the total; program involves the construction of at least 
two, and possibly three, carriers: see International 
Defense Review, 3/89, p. 248. 
Pacific Defence Reporter, Annual Reference Edition 1988/ 
89, p. 89 and Jane IS Fighting Ships 1985/86, p. 141. 
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Table 2.5. Projected ship strength of the Indian navy in the 
late 1990s * 
Submarines 
Aircraft 
carriers 
Destroyers 
Frigates 
Corvettes 
Minor surface 
combatants 
Mine warfare 
vessels 
Amphibious 
vessels 
Support 
vessels 
Totals 
1989 
17 
2 
5 
24 
5 
27 
18 
19 
18 
135 
1999 
22 
2 
7 
27 
13 
31 
24 
30 
29 
185 
Remarks 
+ 4 SINDHUGKOSH-class, 
2 SHISHUMAR-class and 
3 CHARLIE or VICTOR-
class; - 4 KURSURA-
class 
+ one CHARLES DE GAULLE 
class; but INS VIKRANT 
non-operational 
+ 2 Project 15 class 
+ 6 KHUKRI-class; - 2 
BEAS-class and one 
KRISTNA-class (non-
operational) 
+ 8 VEER-class 
+ 10 SDB Mk 3 fast 
attack craft; - 6 
VIDYUT-class fast 
attack craft 
+ 6 MAHE-class 
+ one L8L; + 4 GORPHAD-
class L8M and + 6 LCU 
significant increases 
in at-sea logistic 
support 
* Note that these figures do not include the Indian 
Coastguard. 
li ~ 
The significance of an Indian navy with some 185 ships 
and submarines by the late 1990s is that India's strategic 
position in the Indian Ocean region will be further strengthened. 
Both in quantitative and qualitative terms, India's maritime 
forces will continue to be superior to any other regional power 
and, indeed, superior to any foreseeable combination of regional 
naVles. India's neighbours may well ask why India needs a navy 
of 185 ships and submarines. 
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CHAPTER 3 - IS INDIA'S SOVEREIGNTY UNDER TIiREAT? 
Maritime Rationale 
India's overall strategic preoccupation is the security 
of its land borders with Pakistan and China. It is these borders 
that successive invaders frequently crossed in their conquest of 
the sub-continent. Somewhat paradoxically, there is little to 
suggest that the growth of the modern Indian navy has been related 
directly to the threat posed by either of India's traditional 
adversaries. 1 
Post-1965 arguments for naval expansion were advanced 
on three grounds - geostrategic importance as a regional power, 
protection of seaborne trade and offshore resources, and the need 
for balanced growth between the three services. 2 These reasons 
expressly avoided the identification of, or linkage to, any 
immediate or clearly identified threat. Indeed, the strongest 
argument by domestic critics against maritime expansion has been 
the lack of any visible naval threat. 
1 
2 
R.G.C. Thomas, Tne Defence of India: A Budgetary 
Perspective of Strategy and Politics, Macmillan, New 
Delhi, 1978, p. 236. 
See Thomas, Defence of India, p. 208 and R.G.C. Thomas, 
Indian Security Policy, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, New Jersey, 1986, p. 153. 
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The Threat From Pakistan 
Nevertheless~ Indian officials and commentators often 
use the 'threat I posed by Pakistan as the basis and explanation 
for India's maritime expansion. Certainly the relationship 
between Pakistan and India has been characterised by longstanding 
disputes - the most intractable over the status of Kashmir. It is 
Pakistan~ alone within the region~ which has the determination and 
potential capability to challenge India's position as the dominant 
power in South Asia. 3 
If Pakistan decided to attack India, geography 
dictates that it would be primarily a land and air battle along 
their common border. Yet even if Pakistan concentrated most of 
its forces in the east, it could at best only match the number of 
troops India could readily deploy to the border area. 4 With its 
superior air power and strategic resources, India should be able 
to repel a Pakistani attack. 
Moreover~ Pakistanis lack of territorial depth means 
that most of its population and industry and all of its defence 
facilities are within reach of India's air force. Pakistanis 
leaders would presumably be restrained by the appreciation that 
a failed attack could provide India with the opportunity to launch 
a counter-offensive across the border into Pakistan. 
3 
4 
See B. Cloughley, 'Regional superpower flexes its 
muscles ' , Pacific Defence Reporter~ February 1989, 
p. 43. 
Pakistanis army has 450,000 troops (19 divisions), 
compared to India's 1.2 million and 34 divisions. 
And in the east, Bangladeshis army comprises only 
90,000 troops and 5 infantry divisions: Pacific Defence 
Reporter, Annual Reference Edition 1988/89, XV, 6/7, 
December 1988/January 1989~ pp. 177-8. 
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Naval operations, from the Pakistani perspective 
anyway, would be peripheral to the land battle. Pakistan could 
attempt to destroy elements of the Indian navy by surprise attack, 
or could conduct raids against shore-based facilities. Isolated 
raids could be conducted almost anywhere on the Indian coastline, 
but limitations imposed by operating range and the need to 
maintain surprise would probably limit such attacks to within 
about 600 kilometres of Pakistan waters; that is, no further south 
than about Bombay. The forces needed by India to counter the 
type of naval actions suggested by this scenario are considerably 
less substantial than envisaged by India's maritime build-up. 
The more likely scenario seems to be conflict between 
India and Pakistan where India is the aggressor. India's 
national pride is offended by Islamabad's persistent refusal to 
acknowledge Indian hegemony, and by the perception that Pakistan 
actively encourages and supports dissent within India. 6 Indeed, 
many Indians consider the very existence of Pakistan to be an 
affront to India. Certainly a real fear within Pakistan is that 
II a revanchist India conspires to achieve if not Pakistan's 
dismemberment, at least its disablement". 7 
5 
6 
7 
Janels opines that "[the Indian navy] could flatten the 
Pakistan navy in very short order": Jane IS Fighting 
Ships 1985/86, Jane's Publishing Company, London, 1985, 
p. 14. But cf. "India ... has only marginal superiority 
over Pakistanis navy" in R.N. Misra, Indian Ocean and 
India IS Security, Mittal, Delhi, 1986, p. 219. 
Cloughley claims, though, that "there is not a shred of 
evidence that the government of Pakistan in any way 
supports the Sikhs": Cloughley, Pacific Defence 
Reporter, p. 44. 
R.G. Wirsing, 'Pakistan's Security Predicament' in 
W.L. Dowdy and R.B. Trood (eds.), Tne Indian Ocean: 
Perspectives on a Strategic Arena, Duke University 
Press, Durham, 1985, p. 317. 
~ ~ 
Even within this scenario, though, it is questionable 
whether India needs a powerful navy, structured as it is to 
provide the full range of traditional capabilities. India would 
probably want to impose a blockade around Pakistan to prevent 
resupply or reinforcement by sea. Imposing a Falklands-type 
blockade, policed by submarines alone, would be more difficult ln 
the congested waters of the Arabian Sea than it was for the 
British in the South Atlantic, but keeping the Pakistani fleet 
bottled up in its base - and even imposing an economic blockade 
does not require 135 or 185 ships and submarines. 
The Threat From China 
At least Pakistan is a known quantity to India and a 
manageable albeit, at times, difficult neighbour. China is a 
different proposition. India's humiliating defeat by China ln 
1962 is still an emotive issue for New Delhi. It is China that 
India sees as its main rival for Asian hegemony. Moreover, it is 
China that India sees as the greater long-term threat, 
particularly since the improvement in Sino-Soviet relations has 
enabled Beijing to redirect some military emphasis away from it 
northern and western borders. The improvement in Sino-Soviet 
relations also militates against the prospect that the Soviet 
Union would side with India in any future Sino-Indian conflict. 
India is also envious of China's nuclear status, and 
probably resents Beijing's permanent seat on the United Nations 
Security Council. 
3 1 
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Until recently, the sources of tension between India 
and China were confined to disputes over land borders, and the 
issue of Tibet. Increasingly, though, India has been vOlclng 
concerns at the prospects of Sino-Pakistan collusion, and the 
perceived interest by China in the Indian Ocean and its littoral.8 
India has watched with concern the construction 
of the Karakoram highway, linking China to Karachi and the waters 
of the Indian Ocean. 9 Chinese assistance to Burma, Bangladesh 
and Thailand is also seen by India as a ploy to gain access to 
the Bay of Bengal, so that China then "can envelop India in a 
pincer movement'''. 10 
Probably of more concern to India is what it sees as the 
emerglng threat posed by China's navy. India cites the Chinese 
occupation of islands in the Spratlys in the South China Sea as 
evidence of Chinese irredentism. 11 Indian officials also Vlew 
the visits by Chinese navy ships to Karachi, Trincomalee and 
Chittagong in 1987 as further evidence of Beijing's burgeoning 
power projection capabilities. 12 During discussions with 
defence officials in Canberra in May 1989, Subramanian claimed 
that Chinese SSBNs are already operating in the Indian Ocean. 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
In his paper 'Strategic Developments in the Indian and 
South Pacific Ocean Regions' presented at the CIORS 
seminar in Perth in March 1988, Professor Subrahmanyam 
surmised that Pakistan may plan to offer a home port to 
Chinese nuclear missile submarines. 
See, for example, Misra, Indian Ocean, p. 170. 
Misra, Indian Ocean, p. 128. 
See S. Dutta, 'China and the Security of India', 
Strategic Analysis (New Delhi), XII, 2, May 1988, 
pp. 139-40 and 142. 
Dutta, Strategic Analysis, pp. 139-40 and Professor 
K. Subrahmanyam quoted in The Australian, 31/3/88, p. 6. 
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China's increasing interest in the South China Sea, 
however, does not necessarily mean a change to China's overall 
stategic orientation. China's enduring strategic reality is its 
long and vulnerable border with the Soviet Union; the improvement 
in Sino-Soviet relations, however, is enabling China to devote 
more attention and resources to its secondary areas of strategic 
interest, which include Vietnam and India. 
China's ongoing competition with Vietnam over the 
Spratlys - an island chain located some 800 kilometres from the 
Chinese mainland - has provoked Southeast Asian fears of an 
irredentist Beijing. 13 And recent media speculation about an 
aircraft carrier for China, linked to its capability requirements 
to operate in the South China Sea, would have heightened New 
Delhi's fear of a Chinese blue-water navy. 14 
Certainly the PLA may demand and get a larger share of 
budgetary resources as a result of its key role in the 
reimposition of control in Beijing in June (even though modern-
isation of the PLA remains China's fourth priority). TIle winner, 
though, will probably be the army, rather than the air force and 
navy which played no part. 
It seems unlikely for the present, therefore, that t he 
navy will get the additional funds needed to acquire even a 
13 
14 
See Tai Ming Cheung, 'Command of the seas ' and 'Force 
projection' in Far Eastern Economic Review, 27 July 
1989, pp. 16-9 and S. Bilveer, 'Southeast Asia: New 
balance, new powers I in Asian Defence Journal, 11/89, 
p. 10. 
See, for example, Tai Ming Cheung's articles in 
Far Eastern Economic Review, 27 July 1989, pp. 16-20. 
33 
single aircraft carrier. 15 The more likely scenario is that the 
navy will continue to improve its capabilities to operate ln 
regional waters and in the South China Sea. In lieu of an 
aircraft carrier, the navy will probably devote research and 
funding to an air-to-air refuelling capability, to give its 
fighter aircraft the capability to operate over the Spratlys from 
the mainland (or Hainan Island). 
In the longer term, China undoubtedly will work towards 
a blue-water navy. A decision to acquire aircraft carriers could 
be made within the next five years. If and when China makes the 
decision to acquire the capability, it would reasonably then take 
another 10-15 years just to acquire the ships, and another five 
years or so to develop the capability to operate them as a viable 
naval task force. 16 
On this basis, it seems unlikely that China could 
develop a blue-water navy, capable of operating in (with organic 
air support, and not just visiting) the Indian Ocean, before at 
least 2010. Even then, it should not necessarily be assumed that 
India and the Indian Ocean will be the focus of China's interest. 
The important point also is that any naval force attempting to 
enter the Indian Ocean would first have to transit one of the 
narrow straits of the Indonesian archipelago. 
15 
16 
During discussion at the 'Australia and the Indian 
Ocean l seminar in Perth in March 1988, Professor 
Subrahmanyam claimed that China is likely to acquire up 
to eight aircraft carriers. 
Admiral H. Hardisty CINCPAC noted in February 1989 that 
"a long term Chinese threat doesn't make a lot of sense, 
at least ... not in this century. ": quoted during an 
interview in Pacific Defence Reporter, February 1989, 
p. 42. 
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To prevent Chinese ingress during hostilities, India would seem to 
need only a suitable combination of submarines, surface ships and 
aircraft positioned at these points, rather than a two or three 
carrier surface battle group. 
In summary, India is quite right to be worried about 
Chinese -adventurism ' in the South China Sea, and the possibility 
that China will one day attempt to project its influence into the 
Indian Ocean. At this stage, though, Indian concerns as to the 
threat to India's sovereignty posed by China's maritime expansion 
are almost certainly premature. More importantly, it does not 
seem that the current or planned force structure of the Indian 
navy relates directly to the threat that even a Chinese blue-water 
navy may pose next century. 
The Influence Of The Superpowers 
India also has humiliating memories of the American 7th 
Fleet task force - headed by USS ENTERPRISE - entering the Bay of 
Bengal in 1971, effectively in support of Pakistan. Indeed, s~ome 
Indian commentators claim that the subsequent objective of India's 
maritime expansion has been to contend with the threats "perceived 
to arise from the ingress of superpower navies into the Indian 
Oceanl'. 17 
Indian -hawks I frequently assert that the United States 
has plans for a joint US/Pakistan base at Gwadar in Pakistan, that 
17 See O. Marwah, -India's Strategic Perspectives on the 
Indian Ocean l in Dowdy and Trood, The Indian Ocean, 
p. 315 and J.P. Anand, -India's Island and Other Ocean 
Territories: Strategic Environment', Strategic Analysis 
(New Delhi), XII, 2, May 1988, p. 183. 
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naval facilities on the Baluchistan coast are being upgraded for 
US use, and that the United States is seeking additional 
facilities in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. 18 The inference is that 
collusion between the United States and Pakistan is increasing the 
threat to India. 
In reality, superpower naval interests in the Indian 
Ocean do not centre on India. 19 The subcontinent is a secondary 
sphere of superpower contention and is declining in importance 
in the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq war and the withdrawal of the 
Soviets from Afghanistan. The US presence in the Indian Ocean 
aims to preserve US ability to project power in defence of its own 
and Western interests in the Gulf, to protect the vital sea lines 
of communication across the Indian Ocean, and to provide security 
assistance for and through Pakistan, largely because of 
Afghanistan. 
The Soviet Union's strategic interests in the Indian 
Ocean relate primarily to the sea lanes between Europe and 
the Soviet Far East, and to the containment of China on its 
southern flank. The Soviet Union also has a competitive interest 
in countering American influence in the reglon. 
In the coming decade, superpower influence and interest 
ln the region is likely to decline even further. The Soviet 
Union is still India's major source of arms - this is discussed ln 
more detail in Chapter 5 - but the emerging Sino-Soviet 
18 
19 
See, for example, Misra, Indian Ocean , p. 130, and 
Marwah, The Indian Ocean, p. 311. 
See A.J. Tellis, 'Banking on Deterrence', US Naval 
Institute Proceedings, March 1988, p. 151. 
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rapprochement has diminished the strategic importance of India to 
the Soviet Union. For its part. the United States will probably 
scale down the level of its military support to Pakistan. and 
decrease it physical presence in the Indian Ocean. 20 The 
United States will probably continue to maintain its base at Diego 
Garcia - much to India's annoyance - but the US military presence 
relates principally to interests in the Persian Gulf. rather than 
South Asia. This view is shared by a number of Indian 
commentators. who dismiss any suggestion that either superpower. 
and especially the United States. would intervene directly against 
India. or that Pakistan provides the springboard for superpower 
intervention into the region. 21 
Still. the notion seems to persist in some quarters In 
India that a powerful navy will at least raise the cost of 
superpower intervention in the region. 22 This argument appears 
akin to closing the stable door after the horse has bolted. India 
did not have the navy in the 1970s to prevent superpower influence 
In the region; it could have the navy in the 1990s. but there may 
be no superpowers (in the region) left to deter. 
20 
21 
22 
During her recent vist to Washington. Prime Minister 
Bhutto obtained assurances of continuing US military 
assistance. This probably related. though. more to US 
willingness to support Bhutto's hold on democrary, 
rather than support to Pakistan in its rivalry against 
India. Recent press reports also indicate that the 
United States intends to reduce its naval force in the 
Indian Ocean later this year: see Reuters press release 
29/6/89 -US to reduce navy presence in Indian Ocean 
this year' . 
See. for example. Misra. Indian Ocean. p. 175. 
For example. Subrahmanyam. quoted in M.e.Dunn and 
J.A. Ackerman. 'Beyond the Great Game: The India-
Pakistan Balance and US Interests'. Special Report No. 
1. 1989 Series. The International Estimate, 1989. p. 9. 
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The Extended Strategic Environment 
India has not forgotten, though, that Indonesia was 
prepared to help Pakistan in the war of 1965 - allegedly providing 
patrol boats and aircraft, as well as offering to seize the 
Andaman and Nicobar Islands as a diversionary move. 23 During 
the 1971 war, Saudi Arabia also allegedly provided naval hard-
ware to Pakistan. 24 
More recently, India has become concerned that the 
build-up of arms in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf and 
Southeast Asia will facilitate, in times of tension, the ready 
transfer of weapons to Pakistan. In particular, the lessons of 
the Iran-Iraq war suggest to India that Muslim countries in the 
Middle East would be prepared to finance and equip Pakistan 1n any 
future war with India. 25 
There are no indications, though, that any country in 
the region is arming itself in anticipation of an eventual war 
with India, nor even close military collaboration with Pakistan. 
Indeed, and as evidenced by the Iran-Iraq war, there is 
considerable factionalism within the Arab world. Apart from Iran, 
most states have few links with South Asia, and even less with 
India. 
23 
24 
25 
In the unlikely event of war between Pakistan and India, 
See Misra, Indian Ocean, p. 127 and Thomas, Indian 
Security Policy, pp. 152-3. 
See S.N. Kohli, Sea Power and the Indian Ocean, McGraw-
Hill, New Delhi, 1978, p. 135 
Thomas, Indian Security Policy, p. 40. 
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Pakistan would, in all likelihood, receive substantial assistance 
from the Middle East. It would, though, probably be in the form 
of financial aid, logistic support and the -loan' of some major 
weapon systems. This should not be construed as a -muslim 
conspiracy' against India. 
In search of a threat, Indian officials and commentators 
have often cast even further afield. Admiral Kohli, for example, 
has warned that "the possibility of naval collaboration between 
Australia and South Africa cannot be disc·ounted". 26 The 
danger in such pronouncements - coming from a former Chief of the 
Indian Naval Staff - is that such speculation can be construed by 
others to represent a credible threat to India's sovereignty. 
India is quite right to be wary of possible threats to 
its sovereignty, particularly given its wars and clashes with 
Pakistan and China since Independence. Even accepting, however, 
that India needs to be looking ahead to the next century, it is 
difficult to perceive of potential threats to its sovereignty that 
~ 
will need a navy of the structure and size that India is planning. 
If New Delhi perceives that such threats do indeed exist, then it 
should identify them. Until it does, other states will remain 
suspicious of India's motives. 
26 See Kohli, Sea Power, p. 133 and Misra, Indian Ocean, 
p. 186. 
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CHAPTER 4 - ARE INDIAN INTERESTS UNDER TIiREAT? 
India's Exclusive Economic Zone 
As a result of agreements reached at the United Nations 
Third Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) in 1983_ India 
was able to legitimise its claim to an EEZ in excess of two 
million square kilometres - equal to nearly two thirds of its land 
mass and the twelfth largest in the world. 1 The EEZ consists 
not only of a zone extending 200 nautical miles from the mainland 
and around all India's offshore territories, but also a claim 
under the continental shelf principle, extending some 800 
kilometres into the Bay of Bengal. 2 The approximate boundaries 
of the EEZ are shown at Figure 4.1 (overleaf). 
India's interest in the EEZ relates both to defence 
considerations and to the potential exploitation of marine 
resources. By imposing a virtual cordon sanitaire - stretching 
from the Nicobar and Andaman Islands in the east to the Laccadives 
in the west - India is able to exercise a degree of control over 
the strategic approaches to the mainland. India can, for 
example, legitimately monitor the activities of foreign ships -
1 
2 
Under The Territorial Waters, Continental Shelf, 
Exclusive Economic Zone and other Maritime Zones Act of 
1976_ India had already laid claim to a 12 mile 
territorial waters zone, a 24 mile contiguous zone and 
a 200 nautical mile EEZ. 
At UNCLOS III, India unsuccessfully argued that its EEZ 
should be based on the archipelagic principle - taking 
into account its 1200 offshore islands - as had been 
applied to Indonesia and the Philippines: see R.N. 
Misra, Indian Ocean and India's Security, Mittal, New 
Delhi, 1986, pp. 103-4. 
...II 
and especially foreign warships - within India's EEZ. 
Figure 4.1. The extent and approximate boundaries of India's 
EEZ 
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India also has some 35,000 fishing craft and 350 deep 
sea trawlers operating in the EEZ, with catches totalling over 
1.5 million tonnes per year. 3 About five per cent of the yield 
is exported, representing some four per cent of India's total 
exports. 4 Offshore mineral deposits are also in the process of 
being exploited - calcareous deposits, for example, have been 
located in the vicinity of the Nicobar and Andaman Islands and 
rt' 
Lakshadweep, phosphate and barium nodules off the west coast, and 
mineral-rich beach sands in economic quantities off the Tamil 
Nadu, Andra Pradesh and Orissa coasts. 5 
The main prize is undoubtedly offshore oil. In 
1980, for example, India's oil reserves were estimated at 800 
million tonnes on land, compared to offshore deposits of 1100 
million tonnes. 6 The Bombay High is India's premier field, 
I: yielding 29 mi 11 ion tonnes per year (in 1986) from some 67 
platforms. 7 Other possibly commercial prospects have also 
been discovered offshore from the Godivari, Mahanadi and Cauvery 
/ 
rivers in the east, and in the Lakshadweep basin and Gulf of Kutch 
in the west. 8 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
See Misra, Indian Ocean, p. 81, but note that figures 
relate to FY 1979/80. 
Misra, Indian Ocean, p. 81. 
See Misra, Indian Ocean, pp. 78-9. 
Misra, Indian Ocean, p. 80. 
J.P. Anand, 'India's Island and Other Ocean Territories: 
Strategic Environment', Strategic Analysis (New Delhi), 
XII, 2, May 1988, p. 171. But India still needs to 
import over 30 per cent of its domestic requirements. 
See Misra, Indian Ocean, p. 80. 
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UNCLOS III did more than legitimise India's EEZ claims; 
it also raised the level of consciousness within the region 
regarding the maritime environment. More states than ever are 
now aware of and ready to exploit its resources. 9 India, for 
example, felt it necessary to send gunboats into the Bay of Bengal 
I in 1981 to support its dispute with Bangladesh over New Moore 
Island - ownership of which involved a potential EEZ of some 4000 
square miles. India also has yet to agree maritime boundaries 
with Pakistan in the Gujarat-Sind region. 10 
It is apparent that the potential for maritime demarc-
ation disputes exists, as does the potential for disputes over 
fishing access and the exploitation of seabed resources. Indeed, 
when Gandhi cited recent violations of the EEZ to Hawke in 
February 1989, his confidential examples may well have related to 
infringements by Japanese or Taiwanese fishing vessels. 11 
India's Coast Guard, though, was formed in 1978 in 
response to the very need to police fishing infringements. 
smuggling, piracy and low-level incursions of the EEZ. 12 
Although its capabilities are limited, the Coast Guard should be 
able to protect offshore installations from harassment, and even 
intercede in low-level demarcation disputes. The Indian navy 
9 K. Booth and W.L. Dowdy, 'Structure and Strategy in 
Indian Ocean Naval Developments', in K. Booth and W.L. 
Dowdy (eds.), The Indian Ocean: Perspectives on a Strat-
egic Arena, Duke University Press, Durham, 1985, p. 96. 
10 
11 
12 
See Misra, Indian Ocean, p. 106. 
Rajiv Gandhi on the alleged violations quoted ln 
Western Australian, 11-12/2/89, p. 8. 
Current strength of the Coast Guard is 2500 personnel, 
with one KUTHAR-class frigate, 29 patrol craft and three 
squadrons of aircraft: Pacific Defence Reporter, Annual 
Reference Edition, XV, 6/7, Dec 1988/Jan 1989, p. 179. 
may be required to assist the Coast Guard but~ in terms of 
capability requirements~ there does not seem to be an essential 
role for the navy in the protection of India's EEZ. 
Seabed Mining 
At UNCLOS III~ India was one of the five countries 
granted 'pioneer investor' status by the United Nations 
Preparatory Commission for the Sea Bed Authority. India, the 
United States, France~ Japan and the Soviet Union were empowered 
to conduct separate feasibility studies on the commercial 
prospects of mining the resources of the seabed, within a 150~000 
square mile site to be selected by each participant. 13 India 
chose two contiguous sites in the central Indian Ocean, about 2000 
kilometres south of India, and established a cooperative mechanism 
with Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, sponsored by the Economic and 
Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific. 14 
India appears convinced that the extraction of minerals 
from the seabed has long-term economic potential. Indian reports 
claim that one square mile of seabed may yield as much as 70~000 
tons of minerals, including manganese, cadmium, iron ore, bauxite, 
nickel, cobalt and copper. 15 The Indian research vessel 
GAVESHAMI~ for example~ has scooped manganese nodules off the 
seabed near Mauritius, with an estimated value of US$100,000 per 
13 
14 
15 
The investors needed to spend US$30 million on a seabed 
survey - and ten per cent on a specific site - to obtain 
production authorisation from the International Sea Bed 
Authority: Misra~ Indian Ocean, pp. 104-5. 
See Misra~ Indian Ocean, pp. 104-5 and Anand, strategic 
Analysis, p. 178. 
See S.N. Kohli, Sea Power and the Indian Ocean, McGraw-
Hill, New Delhi, 1978, p. 62. 
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square mi Ie. 16 
India1s Department of Oceans Development and the 
National Institute of Oceanography have been engaged in mapping 
and prospecting likely operational areas but, to date, Indian 
activities have not progressed beyond survey and research, 
primarily because the costs are currently prohibitive. A 
requirement may exist, in the future, for the navy to protect 
India1s seabed mining leases and facilities. It seems unlikely, 
however, that the task could ever be more than a secondary role 
for a portion of the Indian fleet. 
Antarctica 
India first established an unmanned scientific station 
ln the Antarctic in February 1982. Its role was to study 
climatic, physical and biological properties in the region as they 
related to developments in the Indian Ocean. By 1985, India had 
established a permanent facility - Dakshin Gangotri - complete 
with a 3000 metre airstrip to enable direct flights to and from~ 
India. 17 India has recently been accepted as a member of the 
the Antarctic Treaty Parties Consultative Group, and has now 
established a second research station in the Antarctica. 
It is difficult, though, to perceive of a situation 
which would necessitate Indian navy involvement in India1s 
interests in the Antarctic. Should India be at war, it would 
16 
17 
Kohli, Sea Power, p. 62. Other reports put the value 
at US$10 million per square mile: P.K.S. Namboodiri et 
aI, Intervention in the Indian Ocean, ABC Publishing, 
New Delhi, 1978, p. 62. 
See O. Marwah, 'India1s Strategic Perspectives on the 
Indian Oceanl in Dowdy and Trood, The Indian Ocean, 
p. 316. 
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probably be necessary to escort resupply vessels through the 
Indian Ocean. Even this, though, would require only a handful of 
ships, and does not seem to justify a specific force structure or 
role for the navy. 
Sea Lines Of Communication (SLOCs) 
India has crucial oil and trading links with countries 
of the Persian Gulf and Middle East (24.6 per cent of imports and 
11.4 per cent of exports), and important trade routes through the 
Arabian Sea to Europe, via the Suez Canal. 18 India has less 
important trade routes through the Strait of Malacca to East 
Asia and the Americas, and insignificant trading links with other 
littoral states. India's volume of seaborne commerce has 
increased from 2.4 million gross registered tonnes (GRT) in 1971 
to an estimated 8 million GRT in 1985. 19 
Particularly in the last decade, Indian officials 
and commentators have become almost paranoid about Panikkar's 
assertion that "the economic life of India will be completely at 
the mercy of the power which controls the sea". 20 The 
protection of India's seaborne trade and sea lanes in general now 
figures prominently in the rationalisation of India's maritime 
build-up. 
Shipping can certainly be interdicted in a variety of 
ways at any point between the point of departure and the 
18 
19 
20 
See Misra, Indian Ocean, pp. 65-6. The figures are 
percentages by volume for FY 79/80. 
Misra, Indian Ocean, p. 59. 
K.M. Panikkar, India and the Indian Ocean, 2nd Edition, 
Allen and Unwin, London, 1951, p. 14. 
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destination - air strikes on ports and harbours, the mining of 
harbours and their approaches, attacks at sea by submarines or 
surface vessels, the mining of choke-points, and attacking choke-
points from the shore-line. 21 Yet for other than major powers, 
mid-ocean interception is a difficult task, principally because of 
the problem of target location and identification. For a 
campaign to be effective in economic terms, it must also be 
sustained over a protracted period. 
For these reasons, it is difficult to identify any 
potential aggressor who could pose a serious threat to India's 
seaborne commerce. Pakistan does not have - nor does any other 
regional power - the capability for mid-ocean interdiction. It 
also seems inconceivable that any major power would try to block 
either the Suez Canal or the Strait of Malacca, simply to inter-
dict Indian shipping. The protection of SLOCs is certainly an 
important element in India's maritime expansion, but the threat to 
India's shipping should not be exaggerated. 
The Indian Diaspora 
The other justification used by India for its expanding 
Indian Ocean interests is the welfare of overseas Indians. This 
has been used to provide a rationale for strengthening relations 
and influence with several Indian Ocean states - notably Mauritius 
and Seychelles - and it has figured prominently in the reasoning 
for India's intervention in Sri Lanka and the Maldives . 22 
21 
22 
Judgments about SLOC warfare are derived from 
discussions with a number of serving and retired 
Australian naval officers. 
Namboodiri, Intervention in the Indian Ocean, p . 234. 
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India asserts a 'natural right' to dominance of the 
conveniently named Indian Ocean~ based on historical evidence of 
Indian commercial activities~ and political and cultural influence 
in the region. 23 The region~ though~ does not have a common 
cultural or linguistic heritage. Nevertheless, the Indian 
communities that have settled throughout the region provide India 
with an opportunity for influence stemming from the notion of 
responsibility for the Indian diaspora. 24 
India has also used gunboat diplomacy in the region to 
ensure the well-being of regimes favourable to Indian interests~ 
to force less friendly regimes to take account of those interests, 
and to prevent instability. Given the small. size of many 
Indian Ocean states, India could deploy and sustain sufficient 
forces to make a significant contribution to the ability of these 
states to cope with domestic or external threats. Some 
commentators see that this security role alone "amply justifies 
[India's] naval expansion". 25 
23 
24 
25 
There is also the view that India is pursuing its own 
version of the Monroe Doctrine; that is, that external 
powers should not intervene in the problems of South 
Asian states, and that no South Asian state other than 
India should arbitrate in regional disputes and problems 
: See S. Bilveer, 'Operation Cactus: India's 'Prompt 
Action' in Maldives', Asian Defence Journal, 2/89, p.30. 
Most Indian Ocean islands have small Indian settler 
communities, with the largest on Mauritius. 
Misra, Indian Ocean, p. 140. Subrahmanyam claims that 
India has an obligation towards these island states: 
K. Subrahmanyam, 'Strategic Developments in the Indian 
and South Pacific Ocean Regions' in R.H. Bruce (ed.), 
Australia and the Indian Ocean. Centre for Indian Ocean 
Regional Studies. Perth, 1988. p. 90. 
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Yet even for this role - which would most likely involve 
sending troops to an island "state to overthrow a mercenary-led 
coup attempt - India does not need carrier-based naval task 
forces, or the force structure needed for opposed amphibiuous 
operations. Rather, India needs the ability to project military 
power with some of the existing amphibious forces discussed at 
Chapter 2. 
The only possible rationale for India to acquire the 
force structure needed for opposed amphibious operations seems 
to be to recover an island state or Indian offshore territory 
seized by a hostile power. It is almost inconceivable that a 
superpower would forcibly take over an island state or attempt, 
for example, to seize the Nicobar and Andaman Islands. 26 Other 
major powers could seize less well-defended territories more 
easily, but it is difficult to envisage a situation whereby any 
regional or other power would contemplate such action. 
In summary, it is agreed that India has a range of 
offshore interests which need protection. It does not seem 
appropriate, though, for India to talk of its offshore interests 
in a collective sense, or to rationalise its maritime expansion 
solely in terms of these interests. A more realistic approach 
would be for India to identify plausible threats to its offshore 
interests, and then decide the forces needed to counter them. 
It seems unlikely that India would then be able to justify, 
on the basis of its offshore interests alone, the structure or 
size of the navy currently being developed. 
26 Yet Indian defence commentators claim that a Falklands-
type scenario haunts Indian military planners over the 
Nicobar and Andaman Islands: Marwah, T,he Indian Ocean, 
p. 303. 
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CHAPIER 5 - WHAT ABOUT INSTITUTIONALISED MOMENTUM? 
Political And Bureaucratic Inertia 
In the early days of his prime-ministership, Rajiv 
Gandhi could have used the excuse of political and bureaucratic 
inertia to explain India's burgeoning defence growth - that it 
was due to the almost irreversible processes set in place by his 
mother. While there would have been an element of truth in this 
explanation, it has arguably been Rajiv's own vision of India's 
technological advancement which has perpetuated and, indeed, 
accelerated institutionalised momentum. 
50 
Ultimately, defence capabilities are a function of 
economic development - especially in industry and technology - and 
political will. For three decades after Independence , India 
pursued an inward-looking industrial development strategy, in 
which import substitution, domestic-led growth, and the expansion 
of the agricultural sector were emphasised. In 1981-82, and in 
an attempt to regain economic momentum, Indira Gandhi introduced 
a program of structural adjustment, which enabled India to begin 
a major modernisation of its industrial base, supporting 
infrastructure and its armed forces. 
Rajiv Gandhi accelerated this process. Under the 
Seventh Five-Year Plan (1985/86 - 1989/90), his government took 
steps to make Indian industry more competitive by facilitating 
the transfer of modern western technology. The government 
--
5 1 
gradually relaxed controls over exports, eased industrial 
procedures, reduced subsidies and provided incentives for foreign 
and domestic investment. Gandhi's vision of a more modern and 
technologically-advanced India was worthy, but he seemed unable -
or unwilling - to expand it to address the problems of poverty 
and to appeal to the broad masses of the Indian people. 
Indeed, Gandhi tended instead to pursue the broadly-
defined 'elite' objectives of modernisation, military power and 
global status. Certainly a factor not generally appreciated in 
the West is that while India has 300 million or so people living 
In abject poverty, it also has an urban 'middle class' of some 40 
to 50 million people. 1 It is this elite that largely 
influences Indian policy decisions. 
But India's economic and technological progress does not 
have to be at the expense of the masses. Nor are the processes 
of change irreversible. In the final days of his prIme-
ministership, Gandhi was subjected to increasing criticism - even 
from within the elite - for his remoteness from the issues which 
most concerned the people, and for under-rating the old Congress 
ideologies of socialism and self-sacrifice. 
Gandhi's loss was due not only to the charges of 
corruption which plagued his administration - it was also due to 
his failure to give a higher priority to stimulating broad-based 
growth, and his failure to distribute income and resources more 
1 
2 
Some commentators put the figure as high as 100 million: 
see Defence Minister Beazley quoted by Sunanda K. Datta-
Ray in The New Statesman, 5/3/89. 
Strategic Survey 1987/88, International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, London, 1988, p. 144. 
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equally. The important point is that the rationale of political 
and bureaucratic inertia to explain India's maritime expansion has 
some credibility when advanced by a newly-elected government. but 
it becomes more and more difficult to justify with the passing 
months of a government's term of office. 
The Budget Process 
Military expansion programs can also be sustained by 
budgetary processes. Defence forces usually commit themselves to 
manpower ceilings. capital expenditure and operating costs based 
on an expectation of funding within one or two percentage points 
of historical allocations. For reasons of inter-service rivalry. 
the individual services also tend to bid for major items of 
capital expenditure to a level at or above that of previous years. 
The Indian defence force is no exception to these 
general budgetary strategies. 3 Over the three-year period to 
1987/88, India's defence expenditure increased by 40 per cent in 
real terms, and in 1988 was 4.5 per cent of GDP and 18 per cent 
of central government expenditure. 4 Defence expenditure for the 
period FY86/87 to FY89/90 is shown at Table 5.1 (overleaf). 
3 
4 
I gratefully acknowledge the assistance provided by a 
colleague, Mr Paul Gibbons, in interpreting the Indian 
defence budget. I have also relied heavily on his 
unpublished article 'India's Defence Budget Dilemma' of 
July 1989. 
Figures derived from various issues of the Indian 
Expenditure Budget (Government of India, New Delhi) . 
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Table 5.1. India's defence expenditure 1986/87 to 1989/90 
Army 
Navy 
Air Force 
Capital 
Sub-total 
% of GDP 
(expressed in billions of rupees at current prices -
note that figures for 89/90 are forecasts) 
86/87* 87/88* 88/89* 89/90 
60.71 64.88 68.48 65.17 
6.68 6.84 7.74 7.57 
20.94 16.56 17.80 17.99 
12.27 31.07 37.27 39.07 
3.9 4.1 3.9 3.7 
Defence total 4.5 4.9 4.8 4.4 
% of GDP 
Note: * Defence expenditure has exceeded budget 
estimates by about 4 per cent in each of 
the past four years. except for 1987/88 
when most government expenditure was 
cut to contain the adverse effects of a 
nation-wide drought. 
Source: Government of India. Indian Expenditure Budget. New 
Delhi. issues 1986/87 to 1989/90. 
53 
The inter-service ratio for defence expenditure between 
the army. air force and navy has remained relatively stable over 
the years at 70:20:10. This conceals. though. a very real change 
in capital expenditure allocations. in which navy ' s share moved 
during the 1970s from 34 to 51 per cent. 5 It is also important 
5 R.G.C. Thomas. The Defence of India: A Budgetary 
Perspective of Strategy and Politics. Macmillan. New 
Delhi, 1978. p. 201. 
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to note that navy has ranked first since 1974. 
India's 1989/90 defence budget - approved in the 
parliament on 2 May 1989 - is about 1.5 per cent below actual 
defence expenditure for FY 88/89, representing a real reduction of 
about 6 per cent. In presenting these figures to parliament, 
then Finance Minister Chavan stressed that India's defence 
preparedness would not be impaired, that capital outlay would 
actually increase by 5 per cent and that more money had been 
allocated for the expansion of the naval fleet. 6 
Nevertheless~ the 89/90 budget figures seemed to reflect 
the genuine concern of the government of the day that the defence 
spending surge of the mid 1980s contributed to an unsustainable 
budget position, with high deficits and high interest payments on 
past deficits crowding out the capital expenditure necessary to 
sustain further growth. 7 To wind back the deficit, the new 
government will need to impose continuing defence spending 
restraint. Even though defence spending enjoys strong bipartisan 
support and was a key element in the election manifesto of the 
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the government of V.P. Singh will 
have to face economic realities. 8 
6 
7 
8 
AFP press release 1/3/89 'India trims military spending 
for first time in 10 years'. 
The budget deficit has risen to 8 per cent of GDP during 
Rajiv's term of office. And financing deficits has 
caused real interest payments to grow at almost 15 per 
cent per year during the 1980s, doubling as a percentage 
of GDP since 1980/81: Indian Expenditure Budgets since 
1980/81. 
Prime Minister Hawke, for example. noted on the eve of 
his February 1989 visit to New Delhi that lithe greatest 
disaster in the huge defence outlays of India and 
Pakistan is the diversion of resources involved": 
Tne Age, 10/2/89. p. 10. 
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Under Gandhi, some restraint on defence spending was 
achieved by using up stocks of spares and not replacing military 
assets. 9 Some government payments to both domestic and foreign 
suppliers were deferred. The air force's advanced jet trainer 
project was postponed. 10 Expenditure on service salaries and 
pensions was also cut by some 9 per cent in the 1989/90 budget, 
but the three major naval ship-building projects currently 
underway were not affected. 11 
It certainly seems, therefore, that defence spending at 
1989 levels is not compatible with India's attempts to sustain 
general economic growth. Although no major naval equipment 
acquisitions have been abandoned or manpower reductions 
implemented, there is obviously tension between India's military 
aspirations and its capacity to pay. 
Indigenous Production 
Since Independence, successive Indian governments have 
reaffirmed the country's commitment to developing and expanding 
an indigenous production capability. Certainly one of the 
advantages of direct overseas purchases is the ability to procure 
quickly specific requirements in response to an emerging threat, 
9 
10 
11 
Both the navy and air force are reportedly discovering 
that they do not have the money to buy the weapon 
systems needed for their ships and aircraft: see 
S. Gupta and P.G. Thakurta, 'Heading for a Crisis', 
India Today, 2/2/89, p. 43. 
Gupta and Thakurta, India Today, p. 43. 
See 'Future Acquisitions' in Chapter 2. 
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rather than the several years it may take to produce the 
capability locally, even through licensed production. 12 In the 
longer term, though, the policy of overseas purchases has a number 
of disadvantages. 
Access may be restricted, as it is presently to certain 
advanced-technology items from the West. The supplier may also 
practise 'spare parts diplomacy' . Overseas purchases are also a 
drain on foreign exchange deposits - as opposed to indigenous 
production which may accrue export revenue. Perhaps more 
importantly, overseas purchases militate against the development 
of wider indigenous capabilities. 13 This is particularly 
significant for India, which views the development of an 
indigenous arms industry as further evidence of its emergent 
status in world affairs. 
Nevertheless, the costs to India of technological self-
reliance have been enormous. The promotion of indigenous 
production has taken large infusions of investment capital that 
could have been used for other more socially useful projects, or 
could have provided a better financial return. 
India also still lacks the technological expertise to 
develop the full array of highly-sophisticated equipment and 
weapons sustems needed by a modern army, despite the fact that it 
rates third in the world in the number of students graduating each 
12 
13 
R.G.C. Thomas, Indian Security Policy, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1986, p. 247. 
These disadvantages are discussed in more detail ln 
Thomas, Indian Security Policy, pp. 248-9 . 
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year from universities. 14 Probably more galling for India is 
that it has yet to establish itself as an arms exporter, while 
China is being particularly successful in the international arms 
arena. 15 
It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that most of 
India's major weapons platforms have been supplied from overseas 
- the majority from the Soviet Union. 16 Soviet military 
products are generally less expensive than those of the West, 
thereby saving hard currency, and their quality has gradually 
approached that of Western equipment. The Soviet Union has also 
readily allowed the co-production of equipment in India. Even 
though the Indo-Soviet relationship remains strong -
notwithstanding the improved Sino-Soviet relationship - India is 
clearly reluctant to depend exclusively on the Soviet Union and 
has purchased major platforms and weapons systems from other 
suppliers in the East and West. 17 
14 
15 
16 
17 
India frequently favours, therefore, the approach of 
limited overseas purchase, followed by collaboration in 
joint or licensed production in India. It has, however, 
been able to develop a nuclear capability and has an 
embryonic space program, with an emphasis on satellite 
communications and remote sensing. 
India is rated only 38th in the world in terms of arms 
exports. But, in part, this is because until quite 
recently, Indian defence industries were not permitted 
to export defence technology. Arms sales in 1988 earnt 
$US45 million: Pacific Defence Reporter, May 1989, p.36. 
Of the 17 operational classes of ships and submarines 
in the Indian navy, 10 have been supplied by the Soviet 
Union. 
As evidenced by India's purchase of German submarines, 
Polish landing craft and British carriers and aircraft, 
agreement with France over a new aircraft carrier, and 
even recent overtures to the United States. 
--
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India's military build-up and maritime expansion, 
therefore, should not be seen as simply a consequence of the 
unrestricted output of India's indigenous production capabilities. 
India may well have production-line techniques for vehicles, small 
arms and ammunition, but the decision to build major weapons 
platforms is clearly a political one. The naval build-up is not 
the end product of a laissez-faire arms industry. 
Shipbuilding Facilities 
Similarly, it should not be held that warships are 
being built primarily to provide employment and continuity of 
technological expertise in India's shipyards. The location and 
capacity of the various dockyards is shown at Table 5.2 
(overleaf) . 
Many of the shipyards are being modernised and extended, 
in part to handle the recent surge in naval construction. Never-
theless. most major shipbuilding projects have experienced 
schedule slippages of up to several years. due not only to 
management and technical problems. but also because of the 
shortage of trained specialists. It would. therefore. be spurious 
to suggest that the risk of idle shipyards is a reason behind 
India's maritime expansion. 
• 
Table 5.2. Location and capacity of India's naval dockyards 
Name 
Mazagon Dock Ltd 
Goa Shipyard Ltd 
Garden Reach Ship-
Builders and 
Engineers Ltd 
Hindustan Shipyard 
Ltd 
Cochin Shipyard 
Location 
Bombay 
Goa 
Calcutta 
Vishakhapatnam 
Cochin 
Capacity 
up to 27,000 DWT (dead 
weight tonnage) including 
passenger ships, tankers, 
floating docks and 
drilling platforms 
barges, trawlers and 
landing craft 
up to 28,000 DWT 
including bulk carriers, 
ocean-going merchant 
ships, dredges and 
harbour craft 
up to 21,500 DWT (can 
build 3 per year) 
up to 75,000 DWT (can 
build one bulk carrier 
per year but increasing 
to 2) 
Source: R.N. Misra, Indian Ocean and India's Security, 
Mittal, New Delhi, 1986, pp. 60-1. 
The Construction Of New Bases 
One of the significant factors that militates against 
the whole idea of institutionalised momentum as an explanation IS 
that since 1985, India has commenced work on, or has announced 
plans for, the development of five new major bases. In its 
Western Fleet region, with its headquarters at Bombay and a base 
already at Goa, India plans to build two new major bases. One is 
H ' -- --
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to be built near Karwar 011 the west coast. in a 25-year project 
(Project SEABIRD) costed at US$2 billion. and one at Lakshadweep 
in the Laccadive Islands. 18 
In the Eastern Fleet region, with its headquarters at 
Vishakhapatnam and a base at Calcutta. India has commenced work on 
the upgrade of a large naval base at Port Blair in the Andaman 
Islands. 19 In its Southern Fleet region. with its headquarters 
at Cochin. India began construction in 1984 of a very-Iow-
frequency communications network at Vijaynarayanam in Tamil 
Nadu. for communications to and the detection of submarines 
operating in the Indian Ocean. 20 India recently announced 
plans to build a newall-weather naval air base at Arkonam, also 
in Tamil Nadu. for use by BEAR F and MAY maritime reconnaissance 
and ASW aircraft and scheduled to be operational by 1990s. 21 
In summary. it is apparent that institutionalised 
momentum - and political. bureaucratic. technological and 
budgetary inertia - have been important factors in India's 
maritime build-up. These factors have certainly contributed ln 
the past to maritime expansion and some. more than others. will 
continue to do so. The point perhaps to be made is that 
institutionalised momentum is not the single-cause 
18 
19 
20 
21 
The Karwar project involves the Australian firm REDECON 
and construction is due to start in the mid 1990s: 
Jane/s Defence Weekly. 4/3/89. p. 352. 
See O. Marwah. 'India's Strategic Perspectives on the 
Indian Ocean l in W.L. Dowdy and R.B. Trood (eds.). 
The Indian Ocean: Perspectives on a Strategic Arena. 
Duke University Press. Durham. 1985, p. 313. 
Marwah. The Indian Ocean. p. 314. 
Jane/s Defence Weekly, 26/11/88. p. 1319. 
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explanation for India's current and planned strategic 
capabilities. 
0 1 
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CHAPTER 6 - IS IT SIMPLY THAT INDIA WANTS MORE STATUS? 
What Does India Want? 
Having examined in previous chapters the explanations 
typically advanced by India. one can turn to the view-point that 
India simply wants power for power's sake. 1 
According to this view. India seeks to compensate 
militarily for the loss of status suffered since the rapid 
economic development of Japan and the other newly-industrialised 
countries left India and the rest of the developing world behind.2 
The argument is that India aspires to great power status and to 
be given its -rightful' place in world affairs. as befits its 
size and population. its political stability. its economic and 
industrial strength. and its military power. 3 
1 
2 
3 
India is certainly annoyed that China has achieved 
This same argument was put by M. McKinley in his paper 
'From Dante to Shannon'. presented at the 'Australia and 
the Indian Ocean Seminar'. organised by the Centre for 
Indian Ocean Regional Studies (CIORS). Curtin University 
of Technology. Perth in March 1988. 
India's leadership of the Non-Aligned Movement has also 
been eroded. in part because of its position on 
Afghanistan. in part because of its perceived 
belligerence in South Asian affairs. 
However. it can also be argued that large armed forces 
do not necessarily provide any operational use in either 
defence or diplomacy. There is not - according to this 
viewpoint - any necessary link between a powerful 
defence force and status. It is only when a major 
power is prepared to exercise its options to use force 
that it gains status. 
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global status with apparently much less effort. 4 India 
measures itself against China, using not just military yardsticks, 
but in all aspects of national achievement. Probably galling 
also is that both the Soviet Union and the United States 
actively court China - but tend to ignore India - and that China 
has a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. 
Although the view is not often expressed publicly, India obviously 
feels that its own size and achievements should entitle it to 
similar attention and status. 5 
Somewhat surprisingly, the explication of this rationale 
has been a product of the West; rarely has it been propounded by 
Indian officials or commentators. Yet is it wrong for India to 
seek a more active and dominant place in world affairs? Indeed, 
does India not deserve to be taken more seriously than many in the 
West would perhaps like? Any objective assessment of these 
questions would seem to find in India's favour. 
The obvious question is why India has been so reticent 
~ 
ln declaring that it wants more status. One explanation is that 
Indians are basically modest people and would not approve of an 
active assertion of India's aspirations on the world stage. Given 
New Delhi's public 'crowing' over the recent test-launch of its 
ballistic missiles, however, this explanation does not seem 
particularly credible. 
4 
5 
Comment by Dr R. Subramaniam to defence officials ln 
Canberra in May 1989. 
For a country attempting to be seen on a par with China, 
nothing infuriates India more than being compared with 
Pakistan: R. Kaul, 'Strategic Developments in Indian 
Ocean' in D.D. Khanna Ced.), Strategic Environment in 
South Asia during the 19805, Naya Prokash, Calcutta, 
1979, p. 101. 
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Another explanation, certainly more plausible, is that 
India does not want to unsettle its neighbours, by publicly 
announc1ng its pursuit of regional hegemony. Yet even this 
explanation is not particularly convincing, for India has 
traditionally paid little heed - at least until recently - to the 
feelings of its neighbours. 6 
The more likely explanation seems to be that India has 
refrained from voicing its pretensions to great power because such 
declared aspirations would amount to an admission that India 1S 
currently somewhere well short of the mark. India is an 
intensely proud country; its leaders are unlikely ever to admit 
publicly that India needs a powerful navy to prove its place in 
the world - their logic would be that India has a powerful navy 
because it is a major power, as evidenced by its population, 
geographic size and economic importance. 
The Historical Analogy 
Even though India would perhaps never admit to the great 
power explanation, it has tried other means to project itself on 
to the world stage. One reasonably subdued, but nevertheless 
persistent approach. has been the 'historical analogy·. 
This stems primarily from the influence of K. Panikkar 
and, in particular, his monograph India and the Indian Ocean. 7 
Panikkar·s book is a reference text at Indian defence colleges, 
6 
7 
India·s recent withdrawal from the Maldives. and its 
announced intention to withdraw from Sri Lanka, are 
driven in part by a desire to improve its image in the 
region. 
Allen and Unwin. London. 2nd Edition, 1951. The first 
edition was published in 1946. 
JIl 
and numerous recent statements by Rajiv Gandhi - such as lIit was 
our neglect of our naval defences that led to the colonial era" 
and IIwe are determined never again to lose control over the 
approaches to India from the sea" - are almost verbatim extracts 
from Panikkar. 
Panikkar's thesis is that a study of India's history 
will show that "any power which has mastery of the sea ... can 
hold the Empire of India, monopolize her trade and exploit her 
un 1 imi ted resources II. 8 He maintains that the Hindu theory 
behind India's historic greatness was II [the] active assertion of 
right if necessary through the force of armsll. 9 
Rajiv Gandhi made frequent reference to the 
historical might of India when rational ising India's current 
aspirations. He seemed particularly mindful of Panikkar ' s 
assertion that "India never lost her independence till she lost 
the command of the sea in the first decade of the 16th century".l0 
Other prominent defence officials and commentators seem 
similarly influenced by the supposed lessons of history. Kohli 
notes that "early Indian maritime activity dates back to over 3000 
years". 11 Misra finds even earlier linkages, noting that in the 
ancient Sanskrit scripture Vishnu Puran, the goddess of wealth 
Laxmi emerged from the sea. 12 Kohli is also quick to point out 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
Panikkar, India and the Indian Ocean, p. 84. 
Panikkar, India and the Indian Ocean, p. 16. 
Panikkar, India and the Indian Ocean, p. 7. 
S.N. Kohli, Sea Power and the Indian Ocean, McGraw-Hill, 
New Delhi, 1978, p. 3. 
R.N. Misra, Indian Ocean and India IS Security, Mittal, 
Delhi, 1986, Preface, p. x. 
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that even in early Indian history, India used its power not to 
subjugate, "but to promote trade and religious and cultural 
intercourse II. 13 
Cynics, though, would claim that status in past ages is 
no justification for contemporary aspirations. The historical 
argument is also based on certain inaccuracies. It was primarily 
the Moghuls of the south of India who were the seafarers, not the 
Hindus of the north. 14 In fact, according to the beliefs of 
Hinduism (especially after 1195 AD). to cross the ocean - or even 
the waters of the Indus or Ganges - is to 'break castel - a matter 
conveniently overlooked by Gandhi and proponents of the historical 
analogy. 
Nevertheless. it was probably a useful domestic exerCIse 
for Gandhi to remind his constituency of their past. and to infer 
that such great power is possible again in the future. The lessons 
of history. however. are not a credible rationale to offer the 
international community as justification for Indials maritime 
expansIon, or for India to be taken more seriously as a global 
actor. 
The Indian Ocean Zone Of Peace 
India has also tried to improve its status through 
proponency of the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace (IOZOP). The 
proposal was first put by Sri Lanka in 1971. but India has been 
13 
14 
Kohli. Sea Power. P. 4. 
In the 5th and 6th centuries AD. Hindus in the eastern 
region of India were reknowned seafarers. 
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its strongest backer. In its current form, the proposal aims to 
restrict the presence of extra-regional powers, both by 
discouraging naval deployments and banning the military bases of 
external powers in the reglon. Still, India's desire to exclude 
external powers barely conceals its objective of limiting any 
presence that competes with its own. 
Yet the IOZOP is largely a product from another era, and 
the attitudes of several littoral states have changed considerably 
since 1971. Some derive much benefit from external aid and from 
hosting -foreign ' bases and, for some, the presence of external 
powers in the Indian Ocean is a useful balance against domination 
by stronger regional neighbours. 15 
It seems, therefore, that New Delhi's advocacy of rozop 
may have been counter-productive, with a number of the littoral 
states presumably now suspecting that the corollary of reduced 
external presence is increased Indian influence. 
Nuclear Weapons And Ballistic Missiles 
Since the early 1970s, India has also sought to improve 
its global status by the acquisition of high-technology weaponry. 
In some Indian eyes, China's position on the world stage is due in 
no small part to the fact that it possesses both nuclear weapons 
14 A.J. Tellis, -Banking on Deterrence I , US Naval 
Institute Proceedings, March 1988, p. 152. 
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and the missiles to carry them. If India acquired similar 
capabilities, according to this view, would not it be accorded 
similar respect? 
The difficulty for India has been that the possession of 
such clearly offensive weapons would sit uneasily with the 
historical experience of the independence movement - the Gandhian 
concept of non-violence. Indian officials usually characterise 
their country as surrounded on all sides by potential aggressors, 
while India's might is portrayed in purely defensive terms - this 
preserves the image of India as a peaceful country with no 
offensive intentions. 
India's detonation of a nuclear device in 1974, for 
example, is still referred to by New Delhi as a 'peaceful nuclear 
explosion I • Along similar lines. India's recent test-firing of 
the medium-range AGNI missile has assertively been presented as a 
'technology demonstration I , rather than evidencing any offensive -
or even potentially offensive - capability. 15 
Increasingly, though, as India's nuclear and ballistic 
missile programs have advanced, it has become more difficult for 
New Delhi to continue to maintain the 'peaceful purposes I facade. 
India now publicly admits that it could develop nuclear weapons at 
short notice, and recent test-firings of AGNI and PRITHVI missiles 
indicate that the ballistic missile program is well advanced, 
albeit armed only with conventional warheads. 
15 
Certainly in the case of India's missile program, New 
See press release by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of 
22 May 1989. 
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Delhi's main reason for development seems to be related to 
prestige; its long-term rivalry with China is a secondary 
motivation. India's nuclear program is also a matter of 
prestige, but the catalyst for overt production would be further 
development by Pakistan of its nuclear program. 
Nevertheless, India still has difficulties in 
6 9 
rational ising, both domestically and to the region, why it is 
acquiring these types of weapons. Indian explanations waver 
between talk of peaceful research and demonstrations of 
technology, and the need to counter the threat of like weapons ln 
Pakistan and China. India may well only want nuclear weapons and 
ballistic missiles to enhance its global status; the problem for 
New Delhi is to allay regional concerns that such weapons are not 
a destabilising influence. 
In summary, the fact that India wants more status does 
not seem unreasonable or exceptionable. Having one seventh of the 
world's population and occupying a huge land mass, in itself 
entitles India to an important position in world affairs. The 
issue seems to be that India has yet to come to grips with 
rational ising its aspirations of status, or deciding how best to 
achieve the status it desires. 
• 
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CHAPTER 7 - OUTLOOK 
The Military Trappings Of Power 
At least in the eyes of a number of its neighbours, 
India has sought to promote its image through military power. 
This perception is fuelled by the comments of some influential 
Indian commentators, who argue that the deliberate development of 
military power is the only option India has - at least initially -
lito count in the international system as a participant in global 
decision-making". 1 
India certainly has taken the lack of US criticism 
of its action in Sri Lanka and the Maldives to imply 
acknowledgement by the United States that India is the dominant 
power In South Asia - if not the Indian Ocean - and that the use 
of force is a legitimate means of achieving its goals. The recent 
US military action against Panama would reinforce this VIew. 
Increasingly, though, it is evident that India is 
mindful of the accusation that it has chosen to rely almost 
exclusively on military power to establish its credentials as a 
major power. At a recent Indo-US seminar in the United States. 
for example. India's Ambassador to the United States devoted 
almost his entire introductory paper to a refutation of such 
1 Once India has achieved equality status in the inter-
national system - according to this view - lithe military 
power factor will become increasingly irrelevant ": 
K. Subrahmanyam. Indian Security Perspectives. ABC 
Publishing House. New Delhi. 1982. Preface p. xi. 
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c r i tic i sm . 2 According to Ambassador Bajpoi, India recognises 
that lithe exercise of military capabilities [is] not an end in 
itself, but ... a component (of national security] II. 3 
Bajpoi did concede, however, that India has only 
belatedly come to an understanding of the role of military power 
In securing national security interests. 4 Bajpoi inferred that 
it has taken India some years to realise - as the Soviet Union has 
clearly found over the last decade or so - that foreign policy 
objectives cannot usually be achieved by military means alone. 
India has presumably also come to the realisation that an over-
reliance on military power has had important implications for its 
foreign policy dealings and strategic relationships with others. 
Relations Within The Region 
India has long maintained, somewhat condescendingly, 
that its neighbours should realise that Indian military power 
contributes to their security and stability. 5 If neighbours 
view India with suspicion and fear then, according to New Delhi, 
their understanding of the role of great powers in history has 
been distorted by Western propaganda. 6 Nevertheless, many of 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
See Ambassador K.S. Bajpoi, -India's Security 
Perceptions', a paper delivered at the American National 
University in September 1989. 
Bajpoi, pp. 2-3. 
Bajpoi, p. 1. Bajpoi claimed that while India had been 
wrestling with the transition from the Gandhian concepts 
of non-violence to the cold-war realities of -power-
politics' in international affairs, the superpowers 
had changed the rules of the game. 
See, for example, Misra, Indian Ocean, p. 38. 
See Subrahmanyam, Indian Security Perspectives , p. v 
and Misra, Indian Ocean, p. 38. 
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India's neighbours are suspicious of New Delhi's long-term 
aspirations, and do not relish the thought of a 'big brother' 
watching over them. Of more concern to them is the fear that 
they may be powerless to prevent India 'helping out' in times of 
internal crisis. 
Certainly as India has expanded its military 
capabilities, it has acquired greater ability to intervene in the 
reg10n. Ten years ago, for example, India probably could not 
have intervened in the Maldives. Indeed, some would argue that 
India was constrained from direct intervention in Fiji only by its 
strategic difficulties in getting there. 7 
Moreover, if and when India does intervene - as in Sri 
Lanka and the Maldives - some fear that India may decide to stay 
on, effectively taking over under the pretext of a continuing need 
for its presence. The fact that India has now withdrawn from 
the Maldives and is planning to be out of Sri Lanka by early 1990 
is probably a reflection, in part, of India's growing awareness of 
the concern that its military build-up is causing to the region. 8 
The associated and practically more ser10us consequence 
1S that India's military build-up encourages a regional arms 
race. While the weaker littoral states may be forced into 
submission, realising they can never hope to match India, the more 
powerful states - and Pakistan in particular - will try to defy 
7 
8 
Alluded to by Goh Chok Tong, then Singapore's First 
Deputy Prime Minister in Tne Economist, 3 March 1990, 
p. 26. 
It can, of course, be argued that lithe attention 
that India's neighbours are paying to the build-up is 
precisely the sort of dividend New Delhi is seeking to 
gain": R. Munro, 'Superpower Rivalry', Time (Asian 
edition), 3/4/89. 
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Indian hegemony. The concern for regional stability is that 
these other states. realising the inequality of the competition. 
may seek the assistance of external powers. or at least promote 
alliances within the region. 
Already. for example. there is some suggestion of an 
emerglng strategic relationship between China. Pakistan and 
Bangladesh - albeit probably confined. at this stage, to the 
supply of Chinese military equipment to Indials neighbours. The 
paradox is that the very deterrence that India hopes to achieve 
may well result in an action-reaction arms spiral that makes 
India no more secure than before. 
Explaining India's Motives 
Part of the problem is that India has failed to explain 
to the region exactly what it is trying to achieve by its maritime 
expanslon. 9 Indials neighbours need to be reassured that 
India "will use its power with restraint and not for its own 
sake II. 10 Rationalising the build-up to different audiences ln 
terms of perceived threats posed by Indials neighbours does little 
to engender a sense of security or stability within the region. 
Moreover. India cannot continue to "stuff onels ears against what 
the neighbourhood is saying in order to pretend that it is saying 
nothing critical li • 11 
9 
10 
11 
At the -Australia and the Indian Ocean l seminar in Perth 
in March 1988, Professor Subrahmanyam admitted that 
"India has been remiss in not explaining the reasons for 
its nava 1 expans i on II . 
M. McKinley. -Why India is set to become a great power I . 
Sydney Morning Herald, 11/2/89. p. 19. 
S.K. Darra-Ray, -The Indian Ocean - III, ln 
The Statesman. 5/3/89. 
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Part of the problem too is that India itself does 
not seem to know where it is gOlng. Indeed, one Indian 
commentator has claimed that Defence Minister Beazley "has 
provided a more forthright view of Indian naval strategy than 
India can itself provide" - referring to Beazley's inauguration 
address at the Centre for Indian Ocean Regional Studies seminar 
in Perth in March 1988. 12 
It is also hardly a satisfactory explanation for India 
to assert - as did Ambassador Bajpoi at the Indo-US seminar - that 
the answer lies simply in a general assessment of India's 
international role and responsibilities. 13 Nor is it 
particularly useful for Bajpoi to assert that lithe question 
answers itself", and that Western officials and commentators ought 
to have a better understanding of India's strategic 
perspectives. 14 
The reality is that India has no equivalent to 
Australia's white papers on defence, and there is practically no 
attempt made to debate the issues either in parliament or ln 
public forums. Defence planning seems to be left almost entirely 
to the military - "there are no inputs from think-tanks, no 
discussion, and everything is left to the generals". 15 
12 
13 
14 
15 
M. Joshi, -Indian Defence and Australia' in The Hindu, 
17/6/89. 
Bajpoi, -India's Security Perceptions', pp. 3-4. 
Bajpoi, 'India's Security Perceptions', p. 4. 
S. Gupta and P. Thakurta, -Heading for a Crisis', 
India Today, 28/2/89, p. 50. 
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The Prospects Under V.P. Singh 
Congress (I) 's electoral defeat may be only a temporary 
set-back for Rajiv Gandhi, particularly given that the National 
Front government of V.P. Singh depends for its survival on the 
Hindu-fundamentalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the 
Communist Party of India. Nevertheless, V.P. Singh now has the 
opportunity to improve India'~ relations with its neighbours, and 
to rein in India's program of maritime expansion. 
7 5 
The difficulties will be that Singh's government is less 
stable, weaker and less able than was Gandhi's to make tough 
decisions. It will probably be pre-occupied with consolidating 
its power base, and foreign policy issues will be afforded a low 
priority. Still, when he was in opposition, Singh claimed that 
India's military build-up was no longer sustainable and that 
defence expenditure was not compatible with India's economlC 
growth objectives. As a former defence and finance minister, 
Singh is well aware of the discrepancy between India's military 
aspirations and its capacity to pay. Faced with economic 
priorities in government, Singh may decide to cut military 
manpower or cancel major equipment programs. 
More likely, though, is that Singh's new government will 
be tempted to follow the line of least resistance and maintain 
existing programs - particularly given that a high level of 
military spending tends to have bipartisan support in India, and 
that the BJP talks constantly of a revitalised and strong India. 
The institutionalised momentum of weapons programs also means that 
it will be easier to maintain existing programs than force a 
change. Budgetary constraints, though, should mean that no new 
• 
) 
major defence programs are initiated. 
The National Front government is committed to improving 
India's relations with its neighbours, and will probably adopt a 
less overbearing approach in defence and foreign policy than 
Congress (I). Domestically, there is some evidence to suggest 
that quite a few of India's elite would prefer that India not 
attempt to develop a role of its own in international affairs. 16 
There is no indication to date, however, that Singh's government 
is about to tackle the more fundamental issue of articulating 
India's strategic objectives, or encouraging public debate on 
India's place in the world. 
7 6 
Behind the bluff and smokescreen of New Delhi's rhetoric 
may well be a strongly-held consensus that India deserves to be 
taken more seriously by the international community, and that 
India wants to become a global actor. Yet until India clarifies 
its own thinking on the issues, develops a clear-cut agenda 
involving public discussion, and reconciles national actions with 
international perceptions, the rest of the world will rightly 
remain suspicious of India's maritime expansion. And India's 
neighbours and the region will rightly ask "what is India up to?". 
16 Subrahmanyam, Indian Security Perspectives, p. 111. 
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